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RECENT DECISIONS
Banks and Banking-Bank as Owner of Draft or as Mere Agent
for Collection.-In Blatz Brewing Company v. Richardson & Richard-
son Inc. et al (Marshall & lsley Bank, Garnishee) 245 Wis. 567, 15
N.W. (2d) 819 (1944); Richardson & Richardson Inc. of San Fran-
cisco sold a carload of hops to the Blatz Brewing Co. of Milwaukee.
To the bill of lading it attached a sight draft on the Blatz Co. for the
net invoice price, payable to the Bank of California, National Associa-
tion of San Francisco. The Richardson Co. entered the amount of draft
and notation "for discount & collection" on the usual deposit slip of the
bank; received credit for it; and withdrew that amount. The California
bank sent the draft to its Chicago correspondent who forwarded the
item for collection to the Marshall & Ilsley Bank at Milwaukee, Wis-
consin. The draft was paid by the Blatz Co. which on the same day
began a garnishment suit and attached the proceeds of the draft held
by the Marshall & Ilsley Bank.
The sole question was whether the deposit by the Richardson Co.
passed title to the draft so as to preclude the Blatz Company's recovery
of the proceeds. The Court held title passed, applying the principle that
in the absence of a contrary agreement determined by intention of the
parties as indicated by the significant factors present, a deposit of a
draft by a customer who receives credit on his account as cash with the
immediate right to draw establishes a debtor-creditor relationship be-
tween him and the bank rather than one of principal and agent for col-
lection. The decision is in accord with the majority rule that the pre-
sumption is, in giving customer right to draw against a deposit, that
title passes to the bank. This is not conclusive but yields to rebuttal by
evidence showing a contrary intention.
The Court's decision is grounded on Thomas v. Citizens' Nat. Bank,
157 Wis. 635, 147 N.W. 1005 (1914) and Aebi v. Bank of Evansville,
124 Wis. 73, 102 N.W. 329 (1905). In the Thomas case a complete sale
and transfer to the bank was found where a drawer indorsed a sight
draft for deposit and received credit for it in a bank which had previ-
ously obtained a guaranty of payment of the draft. In the Aebi case it
was held that where a check on another bank is indorsed by the payee
and deposited in the bank in which he keeps an account, the latter ac-
cepting and crediting it as cash to the depositor's account to be checked
against as he sees fit, indicate, prima facie, the completed transfer of
the check by which the bank accepting it becomes the owner and not
mere agent to collect.'
I Union State Bank of Lancaster v. People's State Bank of Lancaster, 192 Wis.
28, 211 N.W. 931 (1933); Schwenker v. Parry, 204 Wis. 590, 236 N.W. 652(1931); Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243, 49 L.Ed. 482
(1905).
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The view was advanced in the principal case that the majority rule
above stated and followed in California where the transactions occurred
was changed by the Bank Act of that State,2 providing that allowance
of credit for any check drawn on or payable at the bank of deposit shall
be only provisional;3 and that the California statute was a declaration
of public policy which could only be changed by agreement in writing.
The Court refused to sustain this view. Circumstances, it held, consti-
tuted as high an order of evidence as any agreement in writing.4
It was further contended in the principal case that the prima facie
presumption of title from the extension of credit was rebutted by the
following circumstances showing a mere.collection transaction: the tak-
ing of the draft by the bank with the notation "for discount & collection"
on deposit slip; the deposit slip having printed on it that the bank acts
only as depositor collecting agent and assumes no responsibility beyond
ordinary care and items being subject to final payment in cash or solvent
credits; the bank not charging interest until the draft was honored;
the notation on passbook cover that credit allowed was only provisional
until proceeds received; the fact' that the bill of lading and invoice were
attached to the draft from which it was to be inferred that the bank
took the draft for collection and not as a purchase, since it knew the
hops must meet specifications to honor the draft and bank would not
risk purchase of draft but take it only for collection.
The Court rejected Appellant's contention saying that the right of
charge back was merely expressive of bank's right to compel repay-
ment by drawer in case of dishonor and that the notation "for discount
& collection" was ambiguous and could not govern the question of in-
tention since a draft can not be for discount and for collection both.
The decisive facts were that the draft was not listed in a section of
the passbook in which items "for collection" were listed and the evi-
dence of the cashier handling the draft that he dealt only with discount
transaction and if the draft in issue had been one for collection, it
would not have gone'through his hands; and the form used was one
used for discount transaction.
The inescapable conclusion from these facts, the court reasoned, is
that the intention of the Richardson Company and the California Bank
2 Stat. Cal. (1925), Sec. 16c, Chap. 312; Deering's General Laws (1937), Act 652,
p. 223.
3 Bromfield v. Cochran, 86 Coo. 486. 283 p. 45, 68 A.L.R. 722 (1929) held that
where deposit slip contained provision that bank was mere agen to collect but
when it extended credit, sale of check was consumated.
4 Davies & Vincent v. Bank of Commerce, 27 Ariz. 276, 232, p. 880 (1925), held
that intention that bank act only as collecting agent can be inferred from the
circumstances which in this case was shown by Davies' employing attorneys to
collect draft which conduct was incident to ownership of the draft.
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at the time of the original transaction was that title was to vest in the
Bank of California, National Association when credit with right to
withdraw was given to Richardson and Richardson.
CORDULA M. SCHOMMER.
Fraud-No Constructive Notice in Fraud Cases.-Schoedel v.
State Bank of Newburg, 245 Wis. 74, 13 N. W. (2d) 534 (1944), was
an action commenced on May 10, 1937, by the plaintiff against the
defendant bank to recover damages arising out of the alleged false
and fraudulent representation by defendant that a certain mortgage
sold to plaintiff by defendant on March 16, 1931, was a first mortgage
on the real estate therein described.
According to the allegations of the complaint the mortgage sold was
in fact a second mortgage junior to a first mortgage recorded April 15,
1929, but the plaintiff knew nothing of this first mortgage until May
10, 1937, when the summons and complaint in a suit to foreclose the
first mortgage was served upon him. The defendant demurred to the
complaint on the ground that the action was not commenced within
six years of accrual of the cause of action under Section 330.19 (7)
of the Wisconsin Statutes, providing that in an action for relief on
ground of fraud, the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued
until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of facts constituting the
fraud. The trial court overruled the demurrer and the defendant ap-
pealed contending that the plaintiff as assignee of the mortgage, was
charged with notice of the recorded facts establishing the legal position
of his mortgage and that the plaintiff, having constructive notice of
matters of record which disclosed the falsity of the representations,
must be deemed to have discovered the fraud at the time when he
purchased the mortgage on March 16, 1931, and that therefore his pres-
ent action was too late.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding that under the above
statute plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until actual discovery
of the fraud on May 10, 1937, and that the doctrine of constructive
notice was inapplicable under the statute.
The decision is an application of the general doctrine of justifiable
reliance in business transactions upon representation of fact to record-
ed facts. The matter is well put in the Restatement of Torts:' "The
recipient in a business transaction of a fraudulent misrepresentation of
fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have ascer-
tained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation."
1 Restatement of Torts, Sec. 540.
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